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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under section 78A-4~103(2)(j) of 
the Utah Code Annotated. The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction under 
section 78A-3-102(3)(j) of the Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUES 
1. A party is entitled to question prospective jurors about their biases 
and affiliations with the parties so as to challenge jurors for cause and to exercise 
peremptory challenges intelligently. The defendant, Timpanogos Regional 
Hospital ("the Hospital"), is part of HCA (Hospital Corporation of America), a 
national hospital chain. The trial court precluded the plaintiffs from mentioning 
HCA to prospective jurors. Did the trial court impermissibly limit the plaintiffs' 
voir dire? 
Preservation: The issue was raised in the plaintiffs' memorandum in 
opposition to the Hospital's motion in limine to preclude any mention of HCA 
(Record ("R.") 1832-96) and in the oral arguments on that motion and on the 
plaintiffs' motion to take judicial notice of the Hospital's website (see R. 3026, at 
26:12-36:10; R. 3017, at 35:12-40:17). 
1 
Standard of Review: Challenges to the trial court's management of jury 
voir dire are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.1 
2. Otherwise irrelevant evidence may be admitted to cure a misleading 
action. In his opening statement, counsel for the Hospital told the jury that the 
plaintiffs were seeking millions of dollars from "your community hospital." To 
correct this and similar misstatements, the plaintiffs moved to introduce evidence 
that the Hospital was not a public, community hospital but was owned by HCA. 
Did the trial court err in denying their motion? 
Preservation: After the trial court precluded the plaintiffs from 
mentioning HCA, the plaintiffs twice moved for permission to introduce 
evidence of HCA or, alternatively, to prevent the Hospital from referring to itself 
as a small "community hospital," and the parties argued the motions extensively. 
{See R. 3018, at 444:21-445:9; R. 2527-55; R. 3021, at 1552:7-1565:12; R. 3022, at 
1582:5-1611:8.) 
1
 E.g., Alcazar v. University of Utah Hosps. & Clinics, 2008 UT App 222, f 
9,188 P.3d 490. 
2 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision on curative admissibility of 
evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.2 
3. A party is entitled to show the bias of a witness. Three witnesses 
had significant relationships with HCA, the Hospital's parent corporation, but 
the trial court's ruling preventing the plaintiffs from mentioning HCA prevented 
the plaintiffs from exploring those relationships and thus potential bias. Did the 
trial court impermissibly limit the plaintiffs' examination of witnesses? 
Preservation: The issue was raised in the plaintiffs' memorandum in 
opposition to the Hospital's motion in limine to preclude any mention of HCA 
(R. 1832-96), in the oral arguments on that motion (see R. 3026, at 26:12-36:10; R. 
3017, at 35:12-40:17), in the plaintiffs' subsequent motions for permission to 
introduce evidence of HCA (R. 3018, at 444:21-24; R. 2527-55), and in the 
arguments on those motions (see R. 3018, at 444:21-445:9; R. 3021, at 1552:7-
1565:12; R. 3022, at 1582:5-1611:8). 
Standard of Review: A trial court's exclusion of evidence is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion.3 In determining whether the right of cross-examination 
2
 Barson ex rel. Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 840 
(Utah 1984). 
3
 E.g., Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, \ 21,190 P.3d 1269. 
3 
has been unduly restricted, an appellate court considers the nature of the 
excluded inquiry, whether the field of inquiry was adequately covered by other 
questions that were allowed, and the overall quality of the cross-examination 
viewed in relation to the issues actually litigated at trial.4 
4. A plaintiff may offer rebuttal evidence to refute the testimony of a 
defense witness, even if the testimony is somewhat repetitive of evidence in the 
plaintiffs case-in-chief. The trial court excluded Dr. Nageotte, one of the 
plaintiffs' proposed rebuttal experts, on the grounds that his testimony would 
have been cumulative. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in doing so? 
Preservation: The plaintiffs designated Dr. Nageotte as an expert witness 
they might call at trial. (R. 201, <f 6; R. 205,12; R. 1011,%4.) The Hospital moved 
in limine to limit his testimony on the standard of care. (R. 1386.) The plaintiffs 
responded to that motion. (R. 1946-64.) The parties argued the motion at trial, 
and the court took the motion under advisement. (R. 3019, at 811:17-822:11.) 
After the Hospital rested, the plaintiffs asked to read Dr. Nageotte's deposition in 
rebuttal, but the court denied their request. (R. 3023, at 2084:17-2093:13.) 
4
 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 467, at 442, n.15 (2002) (citing State v. Lewis, 717 
A.2d 1140 (Conn. 1998)). 
4 
Standard of Review: A trial court's refusal to allow a tvhntt ii -.. im^ 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.5 
5- A party does not have to disclose a rebuttal witness if the need for 
her testimony could not have reasonably been anticipated. The plaintiffs wanted 
to call a rebuttal witness to show that Ms. Harvey, the Hospital's liability witness, 
had recently taught nurses contrary to her trial testimony. The trial court 
excluded the witness because she was not disclosed within the time for disclosing 
witnesses, even though she v\ ould have testified about events that only recently 
occurred. Did the trial court err? 
Preservation: This issue was raised at trial (See R. 3023, at 2077:7-2084:9.) 
Standard of Review: A trial courl's refusal to allow a rebuttal witness is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.6 
6 A witness may qualify as an expert by education, training, or 
experience. The plaintiffs wanted to call an expert who the Hospital had 
designated as an expert and who had worked as a labor and delivery nurse and 
5
 See Astill v. Clark 956 P.2d 1081,1087 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding rebuttal 
evidence). 
6
 See id. 
5 
taught labor and delivery nurses. The trial court excluded her testimony. Did 
the trial court abuse its discretion in doing so? 
Preservation: The plaintiffs raised the possibility of using the witness's 
deposition at trial when the trial court allowed the Hospital to withdraw the 
witness as an expert and substitute Ms. Harvey. (R. 3014, at 28:1-29:13.) The 
Hospital filed a motion in limine to exclude the witness's testimony at trial. (R. 
1067.) The plaintiffs opposed the motion. (R. 1974-2123.) The parties argued the 
motion at trial, and the court granted the motion. (R. 3019, at 804:15-811:16.) 
Standard of Review: A trial court's ruling on an expert witness's 
qualifications is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.7 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(4) is determinative of the fifth issue. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a) and Utah Rule of Evidence 702(a) are 
determinative of the sixth issue. These rules are set out in the addendum. 
Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329,1337 (Utah 1993). 
6 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in Hie I "iiin11 
Below, 
This is a medical malpractice case. The plaintiffs, Ryan and Mandy 
Braithwaite, brought this action against Mandy's obstetrician, Dr. Robert C 
Richards, and against Timpanogos Regional Hospital ("the Hospital"), alleging 
that the defendants' negligence in monitoring Mandy's labor and delivering their 
son Trevin caused Trevin to be deprived of oxygen and consequently to be born 
with severe and permanent brain damage. (See R. 87-92.) Dr. Richards settled 
with the plaintiffs before trial and was dismissed from the case. (See R. 936-37.) 
The case went to trial against the Hospital. The jury returned a verdict in favor of 
the Hospital, finding that it did not breach the standard of care. (R. at 2724-2727.) 
The plaintiffs have appealed from the judgment entered on that verdict. 
(Additional facts relating to the course of proceedings in the trial court and the 
issues on appeal are set oiit in the Statement of Facts and the Argument, infra J 
B Statement of Facts 
The Braithwaites went to the Hospital in the early morning of January 2, 
1999. Mandy Braithwaite was in labor, having been induced the afternoon 
before. (See R. 3021, at 1479:22-1480:12.) During labor, fetal heart monitoring 
7 
showed a troubling pattern of decelerations in the baby's heart rate, which 
correlate with a decrease in oxygen. (See, e.g., R. 3018, at 391:7-395:8.; R. 3020, at 
1184:1-1196:9.) There was a prolonged deceleration at about 4:30 a.m., while Dr. 
Richards was attaching an internal fetal heart monitor to Trevin's scalp. Mandy 
was then repositioned, and Trevin's heart rate recovered. (See R. 3018, at 392:3-
21; R. 3020, at 1188:15-1190:17.) Dr. Richards then left the Hospital. (See R. 3019, 
at 940:22-941:5.) Trevin continued to experience decelerations in his heart rate 
until about 5:50 a.m., when he had another severe, prolonged deceleration. (See 
R. 3018, at 394:24-395:8.) Virginia Law, the nurse caring for Mandy at the time, 
was relatively new to the labor and delivery floor. (See R. 3019, at 829:14-831:6.) 
She did not advise Dr. Richards of any of these decelerations. At 6:00 a.m., a new 
nurse (Rynda Christensen) came on duty. (See R. 3019, at 866:11-17.) At 6:03 
a.m., Trevin suffered another prolonged deceleration. The new nurse had Dr. 
Richards called at about 6:05 a.m. (See id. at 871:20-873:3, 946:1-21.) Dr. Richards 
ordered an emergency Caesarean section and returned immediately to the 
Hospital. (Id. at 947:10-19.) Trevin was delivered at 6:28 a.m. (See id. at 950:13-
22.) He was "basically dead"; his Apgar score was zero. (R. 3018, at 447:12-15.) 
The resuscitation team was eventually able to resuscitate Trevin, but he is now 
8 
severely disabled. He suffers from mixed cerebral palsy, with elements of both 
spastic quadriplegic cerebral palsy and extrapyramidal cerebral palsy, the type of 
cerebral palsy characteristically seen after near total acute asphyxia at birth. (See 
id at 540:3 10; R. 3020, \ it 1 001 :21 24, 1 060:12-19.) I he plaintiffs claimed that the 
Hospital, aetiiig through its labor and delivery nurses, breached the applicable 
standard oi can1 by not calling 1 >r. Richards sooner and that, because of the 
I l o sp i t a l s bivtu li, I t w i n w a s d e p r i v e d oi o w g c n :<»r ? n e x t e n d e d p e r i o d oi t i m e 
(/atisiug IniIi In I it1 Inn in n ill) i e r e b r a l
 r\*;^ r ••• i l a m t i t t s c l a i m e d tha t , i 1 lite 
( l o s ( n l a l h a d t aiillcd I'hi Is' n In, in nils a l ia > • i ! - u , i i i i , ' ' i . , : ; \ } p . *» hi- u o u l u 
I I i \ v I K N a n a b l e I< * 1 * • I • *«*»"i I i •"» " n I » \ » v4n would not have 
si iffered ai t/y ir tji n y (See'R 3018 at 5- * *h4 • •. - • 4-953:1';'.) 
li t tl le coi use of discov ery tl te I lospital desigi lated I axiiie A i iderson, a 
local iiiiif'si', to sarve .ii lis r^|"t tl n lln iniiMiij; sftiinLiml i»l ran1 \K, J4!v4y i 
Ixliiisi Aanlai'snii ivas. do|u >*,n i and tin iiastiim a \\ w as anneal nl ilia' I Inspilal in 
some iiespeels |S<r, <\<s> h l 101.,7 iid ' .h 111),',U I 11 > 1  i llitl l.s all | ;\l!ei iin 
deadline for designating experts 1 lad passed (ai id a fter ne v v coi J i isel ei itered ai t 
appearance for the I lospital) tl te I lospital desigi lated. a i !ev\ > m n "sii ig expert (R. 
595-98.) The trial court allow ed tl le I lospita 1 to desigi late a i iew i n irsing expert 
9 
over the plaintiffs7 objection {see R. 736-45), but indicated that it was inclined to 
let the plaintiffs use Nurse Anderson's deposition at trial if she would not testify. 
{See R. 3014, at 28:1-29:13.) But at trial, the court granted the Hospital's motion in 
limine to exclude Nurse Anderson's testimony on the standard of care for the 
Hospital. (R. 3019, at 810:18-811:11.) 
Before trial, the plaintiffs asked the court to take judicial notice of the 
Hospital's website (R. 1039-51), which included a link to an HCA Healthcare 
website {see R. 1045.) The Hospital is owned by HCA (aka Hospital Corporation 
of America). The trial court indicated that it would have taken judicial notice of 
the Hospital's website but for the reference to HCA. (R. 3026, at 34:4-16, 35:3-5.) 
The Hospital filed motions in limine to preclude any reference to the 
wealth or poverty of the parties (R. 1062-64) and to preclude any mention of 
HCA at trial (R. 1211-31). The plaintiffs agreed not to mention the wealth or 
poverty of either party (R. 1599), but argued that evidence of the Hospital's 
affiliation with HCA was relevant, not only as background information but also 
to discover biases of prospective jurors and to cross-examine the Hospital's 
witnesses for bias. (R. 1832-96.) The plaintiffs specifically asked to show the 
affiliation between the Hospital and HCA "to show that Timpanogos is not a 
10 
tiny, rural hospital but, instead, has the equipment, a network where it can 
get equipment, staff, training on a par with hospitals around the country." (R. 
3026, at 27:20-24.) The plaintiffs requested four voir dire questions going to 
prospective jurors' contacts with IICA and the effect those experiences may have 
had on their opinions about the Hospital. (See R. 2421-22.) The trial court 
initially indicated that it would allow the plaintiffs to question prospective jurors 
in voir dire about any relationship they may have to HCA but would exclude any 
reference to HCA during the trial. (R. 3026, at 34:17-35:5.) Bui the court idle. 
reversed itself and refused to let the plaintiffs mention HCA even in voir dire. 
(R. 3017, at 35:12-40:10.) 
During the Hospital's opening statement, counsel for the Hospital referred 
to the Hospital as "a community hospital in Orem" (R. 3018, at 368:21), and told 
the jury: "Yoi i heard Ms. Lybbert [plaintiffs' counsel] saying that she wants 11 to 
$15 million from your community hospital/' (Id. at 374:13-15 (emphasis added).) 
At a break, outside the presence of the jury, the plaintiffs renewed their motion to 
talk about I ICA based on defense counsel's opening statement, but the trial court 
denied the motion. (See id. at 444:21-445:9.) Defense counsel made similar 
references to tlle I lospital as a "community hospital" throughout the plaintiffs' 
case-in-chief. (See id. at 468:15-16; R. 3020, at 1126:25-1127:3,1251:15-16.) The 
plaintiffs filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its ruling precluding them 
from mentioning HCA, on the grounds that the Hospital had created a 
misleading and prejudicial impression in the minds of the jurors that it was 
simply a small, community-owned hospital that could not afford to pay a multi-
million dollar verdict and not part of a for-profit national hospital chain. (R. 
2526-52.) But the trial court denied the motion. (See also R. 3021, at 1552:7-
1565:12; R. 3022, at 1582:5-1611:8.) 
During the trial testimony of Dr. Richards, the jury heard a passing 
reference by Dr. Richards to the Hospital as "an HCA hospital." (R. 3019, at 
912:6-7.) But the plaintiffs were precluded from cross-examining the Hospital's 
witnesses regarding their relationship to HCA. (See, e.g., id. at 860:3-864:17.) 
The Hospital's expert on the standard of care, Nurse Carol Harvey, counts 
HCA as one of her clients and has served as an expert for HCA in other cases 
involving HCA hospitals, including another HCA hospital in Utah. (See R. 1849, 
at 150:16-151:12; R. 1894.) She was aware of three or four HCA hospitals she had 
testified for in the last two to four years and has done training programs at HCA 
hospitals. (See R. 2546; R. 2529, at 14:7-15:1,17:5-22.). 
12 
Ms. Harvey testified at trial regarding the standard of care for labor and 
delivery nurses, lii the course of her testimony, she said, "I don't want you to 
think Fm not testifying the same as I've done in other places." (R. 3022, at 1655:8-
1 0.) The plaintiffs had a rebuild! witness, Judith Walker, who had recently 
become aware of a seminar that Ms. Harvey had taught just a few weeks before 
trial. Ms. Walker was prepared to say that what Ms. Harvey taught nurses was 
different from what she testified to, but the trial o .'ii rt would not allow the 
plaintiffs to call Ms. Walker as a rebuttal witness. (See R. 3023, at 2077:20-2084:9.) 
The trial court also precluded the plaintiffs from presenting the deposition 
testimony of Dr. Michael Nageotte in rebuttal. (Id. at 2084:17-2093:13.) Dr. 
Nageotte would have rebutted Nurse Harvey's testimony on the interpretation of 
the fetal monitoring strips in the case. (See id. at 2085:22-24.) 
Additional facts relating to the issues on appeal are set out in the 
argument, infra. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I he trial court's evidentiary rulings deprived the plaintiffs of a fair trial. 
Its decision to preclude the plaintiffs from mentioning HCA, the Hospital's 
parent company, permeated every aspect of the trial, from jury selection through 
closing arguments. It prevented the plaintiffs from challenging potential jurors 
for cause and from exercising their peremptory challenges intelligently. (Pt. LA.) 
By precluding the plaintiffs from showing the Hospital's affiliation with 
HCA, the trial court also left the jury with the erroneous impression that the 
defendant was just a "small community hospital/' Defense counsel took 
advantage of this ruling repeatedly to imply to the jury that the Hospital did not 
have the resources to pay a verdict and that a verdict against the Hospital would 
hurt the jurors' community. (Pt. LB.) 
The ruling also prevented the plaintiffs from showing the jury the bias of 
three critical witnesses-the two nurses involved and the Hospital's only liability 
expert, Ms. Harvey. All depended on HCA, the Hospital's parent corporation, 
for all or part of their livelihoods, yet the plaintiffs could not show the jury the 
significant potential for bias that these witnesses had. At the same time, the 
Hospital was able to suggest that the plaintiffs' experts were biased because of 
their relationships with the law firm representing the plaintiffs and with other 
plaintiffs. (Pt.I.C.) 
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Not only did the trial court prevent the plaintiffs from fully exploring Ms. 
Harvey's bias on cross-examination, but it also prevented the plaintiffs from 
calling any witness to rebut her testimony. (Pt. II.) Dr. Nageotte would have 
rebutted her testimony on the proper interpretation of the fetal heart monitoring 
strip. (See pt. TT -V) Judiih Walker would have shown that what Ms. Harvey 
taught nurses was different from what she told tlu ju ry. -KSec pt. ILB.) And 
Laurie Anderson, who was previously
 iuiS fo ward as an expert by the Hospital 
itself, would have refuted parts of Ms. Harvey's testimony. (See pt. II.C.) The 
trial court excluded all of them from testifying, for various reasons. But the mere 
fact that some of their testimony may have been cumulative of other testimony 
did not justify excluding them entirely. 
The cumulative effect of the I rial court's rulings was to make Ms. Harvey's 
testimony bulletproof. The plaintiffs could not show her bias on cross 
examination, and they could not call a rebuttal witness to refute her testimony. 
As the Hospitals only expert on the standard of care applicable to the Hospital 
and its nurses, Si>. i larvey was the key witness in the case. Her testimony was 
diametrically opposed to that -i -»=: | >Iaintiffs' nursing expert, Dr. I,aura 
Mahlmeister. (Compare, e.g., B. >iL\. ii «(>l VI ^ 17 {Uthe nurses caring for this 
mother and baby, met the standard of care appropriate for that time in this 
state") (testimony of Ms. Harvey), with R. 3018, at 412:13-14 ("the nurses 
breached the standard of care in failing to call Dr. Richards sooner") (testimony 
of Dr. Mahlmeister).) The jury chose to believe Ms. Harvey over Dr. 
Mahlmeister. Had the trial court allowed the plaintiffs to properly challenge Ms. 
Harvey's credibility and conclusions, "a different result may well have been 
reached."8 The trial court therefore committed reversible error.9 (Pt. III.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED THE PLAINTIFFS OF A FAIR TRIAL 
BY PRECLUDING THEM FROM MENTIONING HCA AT TRIAL. 
By precluding the plaintiffs from mentioning HCA, the Hospital's parent 
company, at trial, the trial court did three things that deprived the plaintiffs of a 
fair trial: (1) It prevented the plaintiffs from obtaining critical information that 
would have enabled them to challenge jurors for cause and intelligently use their 
peremptory challenges; (2) it prevented the plaintiffs from correcting the 
8
 Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081,1087 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
9
 See id. 
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Hospital's misleading characterization of itself to the jury as "your community 
hospital"; and (3) it prevented the plaintiffs from effectively cross-examining the 
Hospital's key witnesses. 
A. The Trial Court Erred by Limiting the Plaintiffs' Voir Dire. 
Voir dire serves two purposes: (1) it allows counsel to uncover biases of 
individual jurors to support a challenge for cause; and (2) it allows counsel to 
gather information to intelligently use peremptory challenges.10 "Under Utah 
law, 'a trial judge should liberally allow questions designed to discover attitudes 
and biases, both conscious and subconscious, even though such questions go 
beyond that needed for challenges for cause.'"11 
Here, the trial court foreclosed a whole area of relevant inquiry by refusing 
to allow the plaintiffs to mention HCA, the Hospital's parent company, during 
voir dire. Because the plaintiffs could not mention HCA, they could not 
determine whether any of the prospective jurors had significant contacts or 
experiences with HCA or other HCA facilities that may have resulted in "hidden 
10
 Alcazar v. University of Utah Hosps. & Clinics, 2008 UT App 222, <f 10, 
188 P.3d 490 (citation omitted). 
11
 Id. (quoting Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), 
cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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or subconscious biases affecting the jurors' ability to render a fair and impartial 
verdict/712 The trial court therefore abused its discretion in not allowing the 
plaintiffs to inquire about prospective jurors' connections with HCA. 
This error was harmful because it precluded the plaintiffs from challenging 
prospective jurors for cause and from exercising their peremptory challenges 
effectively. Another juror who had connections with and opinions about the 
Hospital was excused for cause. (See R. 3017, at 19:18-21:3, 46:7-52:23.) But the 
plaintiffs could not explore the possible biases of other prospective jurors who 
may have had opinions about HCA or HCA hospitals generally. 
"[Substantial impairment of the right to informed exercise of peremptory 
challenges is reversible error/'13 Considering "the totality of the questioning, 
counsel [was not] afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information 
necessary to evaluate" prospective jurors.14 Plaintiffs' counsel "was denied 
12
 Id. 114 (quoting Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96,102. n.7 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993)). 
13
 Id. 115 (quoting Barrett, 868 P.2d at 102) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
14
 Id. (quoting Barrett, 868 P.2d at 102-03 (alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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information helpful in the intelligent use of [her] peremptory challenges/ 
Consequently, the trial court committed prejudicial error when it precluded the 
plaintiffs from mentioning HCA in voir dire. 
B, The Trial Court Erred by Not Allowing the Plaintiffs to Show the 
Connection Between HCA and the Hospital to Correct the Hospital's 
Misleading Characterization of Itself. 
In response to the Hospital's standard motion in limine to exclude any 
reference to the wealth or poverty of the parties because any such reference 
would appeal to prejudice or sympathy of the jury, the plaintiffs agreed not to 
refer to such matters and noted that the Hospital should be similarly precluded. 
(R. 1599.) The Hospital then turned around and, in opening statement, appealed 
to the jurors' sympathy and self-interest by telling the jury that the plaintiffs were 
seeking millions of dollars from "your community hospital." (R. 3018, at 374:13-
15.) The Hospital continued to refer to itself as a small community hospital 
throughout the trial. (See, e.g., id. at 468:15-16; R. 3020, at 1126:25-1127:3,1251:15-
16.) The plaintiffs twice asked the trial court to allow them to show that the 
Hospital was not simply a small community hospital but was part of HCA, a 
national chain of 160 hospitals, but the trial court denied their motions. (See R. 
Id. 117 (quoting Barrett, 868 P.2d at 104). 
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3018, at 444:21-445:9; R. 2527-55; R. 3021, at 1552:7-1565:12; R. 3022, at 1582:5-
1611:8.) The trial court abused its discretion in doing so. 
If a party interjects into a case incompetent or immaterial matters, it cannot 
complain if the other side offers the same kind of evidence to correct a 
misimpression or restore balance.16 "The rule of 'opening the door/ or 'curative 
admissibility/ gives the trial court discretion to permit a party to introduce 
otherwise inadmissible evidence on an issue (a) when the opposing party has 
introduced inadmissible evidence on the same issue, and (b) when it is needed to 
rebut a false impression that may have resulted from the opposing party's 
evidence/'17 "While comments made in opening statements are not evidence . . . , 
the 'general principles involved in allowing a party to "meet fire with fire" are 
applicable.'"18 
Here, the Hospital violated its own motion in limine by appealing to 
jurors' sympathy and creating the misleading impression that the Hospital was a 
small, publicly owned hospital that could ill afford to pay a multi-million dollar 
16
 Barson ex rel. Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 840 
(Utah 1984) (citations omitted). 
17
 United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 335 (2d Cir. 1993), cert denied, 511 
U.S. 1042 (1994). 
18
 Martin v. State, 775 A.2d 385, 394 (Md. 2001) (citation omitted). 
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judgment, which would adversely affect the jurors and their community. In fact, 
the Hospital is part of a national, for-profit hospital chain. The only way the 
plaintiffs had to combat the false and misleading impression that the Hospital 
created was to introduce evidence of the Hospital's ties to HCA. The trial court 
therefore abused its discretion by not allowing the plaintiffs to mention HCA 
even after the Hospital had misled the jury. 
C The Trial Court Erred by Preventing the Plaintiffs from Showing the 
Biases of Key Witnesses. 
The trial court's ruling forbidding the plaintiffs from mentioning HCA not 
only deprived the plaintiffs of an opportunity to examine prospective jurors fully 
and left the jury with the false impression that the Hospital was a small 
community hospital, but it also prevented the plaintiffs from showing the biases 
of three critical witnesses. 
The two most critical fact witnesses were Virginia Law, the labor and 
delivery nurse who cared for Mrs. Braithwaite throughout the vast majority of 
her labor and delivery and who the plaintiffs claimed should have called Dr. 
Richards at 5:50 a.m., and Rynda Christensen, the nurse who replaced Ms. Law at 
6:00 a.m. and who had Dr. Richards called at 6:05 a.m. Both testified in the 
plaintiffs7 case-in-chief. 
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The jury was not able to assess Ms. Law's credibility based on her memory 
because Ms. Law had no memory of the events of the case. Within six months 
after Trevin's birth, Ms. Law had electroconvulsive therapy treatments for 
depression, which caused her to lose her memory. (See R. 3019, at 832:14-835:4.) 
The jury therefore had to rely on other factors, such as personal interest and bias, 
to evaluate her testimony.19 Although Ms. Law no longer works for the Hospital, 
at the time of trial she worked for another HCA facility-St. Mark's Hospital. 
(R.3019, at 838:25-839:4.)20 But the plaintiffs were not allowed to show that Ms. 
Law still works for an HCA company. 
Rynda Christensen no longer works for the Hospital either. She currently 
works for Skyline Medical Center in Nashville, Tennessee. (See R. 3019, at 856:2-
6, 859:24-25.) Skyline Medical Center is part of the TriStar Health System, which 
is owned by HCA,21 but the plaintiffs were not allowed to show that either. 
19
 Cf. MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS (2D) CV121 ("Believability of 
witnesses": "In evaluating the testimony of a witness, you may want to consider 
the following: [<&] (1) Personal interest.... [f\ (2) Bias... . [1] (6) Memory/'). 
20
 See HCA website, on-line at 
http://www.hcahealthcare.com/cpm/utah.htm (listing St. Mark's Hospital as an 
HCA facility). (All websites as visited May 16, 2009.) 
21
 See TriStar Health website, on-line at http://www.tristarhealth.com/, 
which, under the heading "About TriStar," includes a link to "HCA Our Parent 
Company." 
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Between working for the Hospital and going to work at Skyline Medical Center, 
Ms. Christensen worked for HCA customer support. (R. 3019, at 860:3-20.) The 
trial court let Ms. Christensen say that she went to work for HCA customer 
support after she left the Hospital, but it did not let the plaintiffs explore the 
matter further. The court sustained an objection to the question "What does 
HCA stand for?" and cut off further inquiry, threatening a mistrial if the 
plaintiffs mentioned HCA again. (See id. at 860:21-864:17.) 
For all the jury knew, both Ms. Law and Ms. Christensen were 
disinterested witnesses. As far as the jury could tell, neither still worked for the 
Hospital or for any entity affiliated with the Hospital and thus had no reason to 
testify in favor of the Hospital (other than to defend her own actions). In fact, 
both Ms. Law and Ms. Christensen had a great incentive to testify favorably for 
the Hospital, in order to maintain their current employment status. 
Similarly, Carol Harvey, the Hospital's key expert witness and its only 
witness on the standard of care applicable to hospital nurses, also has a working 
relationship with HCA, the Hospital's parent corporation. She counts HCA as 
one of her clients and has served as an expert for HCA in other cases involving 
HCA hospitals-as many as one or more a year. (See R. 1849, at 150:16-151:12; R. 
1894; R. 2546; R. 2529, at 14:7-15:1,17:5-22.) But the plaintiffs were not allowed to 
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show Ms. Harvey's relationship with HCA at trial. For all the jury knew, Ms. 
Harvey had no reason to testify in favor of the Hospital, other than the fact that 
she was being paid for her testimony in this particular case. But in fact, she had a 
powerful incentive to testify in a way that helped the Hospital—in order to 
continue working as an expert witness for HCA and its affiliated hospitals. HCA 
is a lucrative source of potential income for any medical expert, since it owns and 
operates 160 hospitals and 180 other medical facilities in 20 states across the 
country, from Alaska to Florida.22 
Had the plaintiffs been allowed to explore the relationships between these 
witnesses and HCA, the Hospital's parent corporation, the jury would have had 
great reason to view their testimony skeptically, since all had strong motivations 
to help the Hospital with their testimony, so as to protect their livelihoods. 
The Hospital and the trial court both recognized the importance of being 
able to show a witness's bias in helping the jury assess the witness's credibility. 
22
 See HCA INC. Form 10-K, at HCA website at 3, 33, on-line at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/860730/000095014409001868/gl7725el0 
vk.htm#tocpage; HCA website, on-line at 
http://www.hcahealthcare.com/CustomPage.asp?guidCustomContentID=56B0A2 
BE-268D-407A-BA31-3223710C7EC0# ("Our Family of Hospitals and Surgery 
Centers"). 
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Yet the trial court's ruling deprived the plaintiffs of that opportunity with respect 
to the key fact and expert witnesses. 
Before trial, the Hospital tried to obtain personal financial information 
from Paul A. Randle, the plaintiffs' expert economist. The plaintiffs moved on 
behalf of Dr. Randle to quash the subpoena in part. (See R. 868-909.) At the 
hearing on their motion, counsel for the Hospital argued that evidence of the 
relationship between Dr. Randle and the law firm representing the plaintiffs was 
important "not only to show potential bias but the extent of that bias." (R. 3015, 
at 6:16-17.) She added: 
If there's an extensive relationship there, there certainly is a 
possibility of bias, that Dr. Randle has an incentive to continue that 
relationship if he's been paid tens or hundreds of thousands of 
dollars over the years. And we think the jury is entitled to see that if 
it gets to that point. 
(Id. at 6:21-7:2.) The trial court acknowledged that "the real central issue here[,] 
the most important part of this case,. . . has to do with whether or not you're able 
to explore potential bias adequately . . . . " (Id. at 8:10-13.) As will be shown 
below, the trial court allowed the Hospital full opportunity to explore Dr. 
Randle's alleged bias arising from his relationship with the firm representing the 
plaintiffs, but, because of the trial court's ruling forbidding the mention of HCA, 
25 
the plaintiffs were not able to explore the potential biases of the Hospital's key 
witnesses at trial. 
In his opening statement to the jury, counsel for the Hospital warned them: 
Now I want to talk just briefly about expert witnesses. You're 
going to hear from a number of paid experts. Each side has hired 
people to come in and testify for you. And there's a few things that I 
want to ask you to watch for. Watch for experts that are making 
more money testifying than they are practicing medicine; watch for 
experts that have an incentive to testify or make criticisms for one side, that 
really don't seem to make a lot of sense and don't fit with the other 
things they're talking about, because what these experts are going to 
tell you is, they're going to say you need to blame Ginger [Virginia 
Law] and Rynda [Christensen] for what happened 
(R. 3018, at 369:13-25 (emphasis added).) The trial court's ruling prevented the 
plaintiffs from showing that "Ginger and Rynda" also had "an incentive to testify 
or make criticisms for one side." 
Counsel then compared its nursing expert, Ms. Harvey, with the plaintiffs' 
nursing expert, Dr. Laura Mahlmeister: 
Laura Mahlmeister . . . makes an awful lot of money testifying. 
She testifies an awful lot all over the country. And just pay attention 
to her testifying experience.... 
Carol Harvey . . . actually does not make most of her income 
as a testifier. She is not traveling all over the country testifying 
either for or against hospitals or nurses. 
(Id. at 371:1-6, 373:16-20.) 
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The Hospital repeated the comparison between Dr. Mahlmeister's 
credibility and Ms. Harvey's in its closing argument: 
And there's a long instruction [on] credibility and Fm not 
going to read it to you[; you] can all read. But it talks about personal 
interests, talks about b i a s , . . . . I assert to you I don't think she [Dr. 
Mahlmeister] was free of bias 
. . . You heard Carol Harvey . . . . [S]he's obviously very 
knowledgeable and very credible and very reasonable. 
(R. 3024, at 2257:3-8, 2259:4-9.) The Hospital "did a little bit of math" to estimate 
how much money Dr. Mahlmeister earns as an expert witness and concluded, 
"She's got a pretty powerful incentive to keep criticizing nurses." (Id. at 2257:11-
23.) Yet the plaintiffs were not allowed to show that Ms. Harvey had "a pretty 
powerful incentive" not to criticize the nurses at an HCA hospital in order to 
please a powerful client (HCA). 
The Hospital's attack on the plaintiffs' damage experts also focused on 
their credibility given the alleged incentives they had to testify favorably for the 
plaintiffs. 
For example, the Hospital spent a lot of time pointing out the relationship 
between Kelly Lance, the plaintiffs' life-care planner, and the American 
Association of Nurse Life Care Planners, an organization that she founded. (See 
R. 3021, at 1310:25-1313:9,1317:23-1318:10.) The Hospital also highlighted the 
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following language from Ms. Lance's website to suggest that Ms. Lance may have 
been slanting her testimony to get repeat business from the plaintiffs' attorneys: 
If attorneys have a good experience with a consultant, they'll use the 
same person again, and one attorney suggests that a nurse life care 
planner only needs one decent lawyer to like you as an expert 
witness and the rest of the cases will come to you as word of mouth. 
(Id. at 1318:21-1319:3.) Defense counsel then pointed out that "there's really kind 
of a business relationship between you as a life care planner, or any nurse really 
as a life care planner, and the person who hires them" (id. at 1320:2-5), and that 
"there's a customer service aspect of that business . . . [ ;] if the lawyer likes you, 
more likely than not, you're likely to get some more work and maybe some more 
referrals" (id. at 1320:8-11). Recognizing that Ms. Lance was not likely to get any 
repeat work from the Braithwaites, defense counsel defined her client as the 
plaintiffs' law firm. (Id. at 1320:17-20.) 
Ms. Harvey may not be likely to testify for the Hospital again any time 
soon, but she could expect repeat business from HCA, the Hospital's parent, if 
her testimony helped the Hospital win. Yet the plaintiffs were unfairly 
prevented from cross-examining her the way that the Hospital cross-examined 
Ms. Lance. 
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The Hospital took the same tack in cross-examining the plaintiffs' other 
damage expert, Dr. Paul Randle, an economist. Before trial, the Hospital 
subpoenaed all of Dr. Randle's records showing the amount of money he had 
been paid by the law firm representing the plaintiffs since January 1,1999. (R. 
875-76.) The plaintiffs moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds that, among 
other things, it went beyond the scope of permissible expert discovery under the 
rules of civil procedure and would have a chilling effect on the willingness of 
experts to testify. (R. 869-71; R. 899-909.) The trial court granted the motion, 
concluding that the documents produced under the expert discovery rules 
provided sufficient information to guarantee the Hospital's right of cross-
examination. (R. 965-66.) 
At trial, counsel for the Hospital asked the court for a "clarification" of its 
ruling and asked to be allowed to talk about "the time that [Dr. Randle]'s 
provided consulting work and the amount of money he's been paid by [the 
plaintiffs' law] firm in order to try and impeach his bias through [Utah] Rule [of 
Evidence] 608." (R. 3021, at 1374:20-1375:14.) In support of its motion, defense 
counsel relied on "the wide latitude in impeaching expert witnesses and showing 
their bias" and asked the court to "be able to at least talk about the number of 
times that he's served as a non-testifying consultant for plaintiffs' firm or any 
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plaintiffs' firm and for the amount of money he's received from that work." (Id. 
at 1376:6-12.) The trial court reversed its prior ruling and allowed the Hospital to 
cross-examine Dr. Randle about how much money he had made working with 
the law firm representing the plaintiffs. (See id. at 1378:7-12.) The Hospital took 
full advantage of this permission. About a third of its cross-examination of Dr. 
Randle concerned his relationship with the plaintiffs' counsel's law firm. (See id. 
at 1443:14-1452:4.) Yet the plaintiffs were precluded from asking the Hospital's 
expert, Ms. Harvey, anything about her relationship with HCA. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the importance of being able to 
examine witnesses for bias and has reversed judgments where that ability has 
been unduly restricted. In Board of Education of South Sanpete School District v. 
Barton,73 the court reversed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in an eminent 
domain proceeding. The defendant landowner claimed that the jury award was 
inadequate. At trial, the landowner sought to call a Mr. Ogden, who had 
appraised the land for the plaintiff school board, but the trial court would not let 
the landowner ask Mr. Ogden about his employment with the school board. The 
617 P.2d 347 (Utah 1980). 
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Supreme Court held that this was reversible error because "[tjhat testimony went 
to the heart of the issue at trial." The court noted that the defendant 
had strong reason and a legal right to ask Ogden the identity of his 
employer.... To deny the defendant that right is to deny him a fair 
trial. The jury was entitled to know the essential background facts of 
the witness so as to be able to give proper weight to his testimony.24 
Here, although the plaintiffs were able to ask Virginia Law and Rynda 
Christensen the identity of their employers, because of the trial court's ruling 
they were not able to show that their employers were owned by the same 
hospital chain that owned the Hospital. 
The plaintiffs also could not show the relationship between the Hospital's 
expert, Carol Harvey, and HCA, the Hospital's parent. The Barton court noted, 
"The term 'expert testimony' connotes a degree of objectivity imposed by the 
discipline and training of the expert," but experts' opinions "often vary . . . 
widely,"25 making the expert's credibility crucial. The court continued: 
The [trial] court in this case prevented inquiry as to the 
identity of the employer of an expert witness. The jury could not, 
therefore, evaluate the process by which plaintiff chose his experts 
nor determine the appropriate weight to be afforded the testimony 
of the witnesses for the respective parties. 
24




. . . More importantly, his employment bore directly on the all-
important issue of his objectivity or bias. This information was essential 
especially in light of the highly disparate views of the same facts that 
may be arrived at by different experts.26 
Similarly, in this case, the opinions of the parties' experts on the nursing 
standard of care were diametrically opposed. Dr. Laura Mahlmeister, the 
plaintiffs' nursing expert, testified that the Hospital breached the standard of care 
by not calling Dr. Richards at least by about 5:50 a.m. (See, e.g., R. 3018, at 423:1-
424:11.) Carol Harvey, the Hospital's nursing expert, testified that the standard 
of care did not require the Hospital to call Dr. Richards before it did, at about 6:05 
a.m. (See, e.g., R. 3022, at 1748:21-25.) And there was evidence that, if Dr. 
Richards had been called fifteen minutes sooner, Trevin Braithwaite would have 
been born without the catastrophic injuries he suffered. (R. 3018, at 563:15-564:8; 
R. 3019, at 951:4-953:17.) The Hospital was able to attack Dr. Mahlmeister's 
credibility by showing that she made a good living testifying for plaintiffs, but 
the plaintiffs were not able to show the relationship between Ms. Harvey's 
livelihood and HCA. 
The Barton court went on to explain that a witness may be biased as a 
result of his or her relationship with a party and not even be aware of the bias: 
26
 Id. (emphasis added and citation omitted). 
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Expert witnesses, like other witnesses, are influenced by 
unconscious, and sometimes conscious, biases. The problem of the 
expert witness's bias has been commented on by Dean Wigmore: 
That bias itself is due, partly to the special fee which has 
been paid or promised him, and partly to his prior 
consultation with the party and his selfcommittal to a 
particular view.27 
If Ms. Harvey herself may not have been conscious of her bias in favor of the 
Hospital because of her on-going relationship with HCA, the jury clearly could 
not evaluate her potential bias because it did not even know of that relationship. 
The trial court's ruling forbidding any mention of HCA deprived the 
plaintiffs of their right to cross-examine Ms. Harvey for bias. "For two centuries, 
common law judges and lawyers have regarded the opportunity of cross-
examination as an essential safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of 
testimony. They have insisted that the opportunity is a right, not a mere 
privilege."28 Utah is no exception. Utah law recognizes the importance of cross-
27
 617 P.2d at 350 (quoting 2 Wigmore on Evidence % 563 at 761 
(Chadbourn rev. 1979)). 
28
 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 19, at 45 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 
2006) (footnotes omitted). See also, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965) 
("There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts have 
been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of 
. . . cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of 
fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal."). 
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examination to a fair trial: "'Cross-examination is the principal means by which 
the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested/"29 "The 
right to test the believability of a witness on cross-examination includes the right 
to show a witnesses] possible bias or interest. The exposure of a witnesses] 
motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally 
protected right of cross-examination."30 
Although a trial judge has discretion to limit cross-examination to some 
extent (such as "'to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation'"),31 
the scope of cross-examination as to credibility is and must be broad 
if it is to fulfill its designated purpose of exposing bias and purging 
testimony of intended or unintended error. Full exposure of a 
witnesses] bias or prejudice is essential if a jury is to be able to fully 
assess the existence and extent of the witness'[s] bias.32 
29
 State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, 655 (Utah 1985) (quoting Davis v. 
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974)). Although Pointer, Leonard, and Davis were 
criminal cases, implicating the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, "courts 
have granted the right [of cross-examination] a measure of constitutional 
protection in civil cases" as well. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 28, § 19, 
at 46. 
30
 State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d at 656 (citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 
474,496 (1959)). 
31
 Id. (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. at 316). 
32
 Id. (citations omitted). 
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Therefore, "arbitrary curtailment" of the right of cross-examination "upon a 
proper, important subject of cross-examination such as the witness's bias is 
ground for reversal."33 
Here, by precluding the plaintiffs from mentioning HCA at trial, the trial 
court prevented them from showing the bias of Virginia Law, Rynda 
Christensen, and Carol Harvey. The trial court deprived the plaintiffs of a key 
weapon that their opponent was able to use with effect—the ability to test a 
witness's credibility by showing the witness's business or employment 
associations, which would strongly suggest bias. The trial court abused its 
discretion by improperly restricting the plaintiffs' examination of the key fact 
witnesses and the Hospital's liability expert. The Court should therefore reverse 
the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial. 
33
 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 28, § 19, at 47. See also State v. 
Leonard, 707 P.2d at 656 ("Because cross-examination for bias is 'so vital a 
constitutional r ight ' . . . and was unduly restricted in this case, we hold that the 
trial court [committed reversible error] in limiting the defendant's cross-
examination of" the prosecution's witness) (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 320). 
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II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT ALLOWING THE PLAINTIFFS 
TO CALL REBUTTAL WITNESSES. 
At the close of the Hospital's case, the plaintiffs asked to call two rebuttal 
witnesses-Dr. Michael Nageotte and Judith Walker. (See R. 3023, at 2078:7-22.) 
The trial court denied the requests. Having precluded the plaintiffs from 
showing Ms. Harvey's bias, the trial court committed reversible error by also 
preventing the plaintiffs from rebutting her testimony. 
A. The Trial Court Erred When It Did Not Allow the Plaintiffs to Call Dr. 
Nageotte in Rebuttal. 
The plaintiffs sought to call as a rebuttal witness Dr. Michael Nageotte, an 
expert who literally wrote the book on fetal heart monitoring. (See R. 1357.) Dr. 
Nageotte was originally designated as an expert by Dr. Richards (R. 205-06) and 
was deposed early in the case (see R. 258-59; R. 1379). The plaintiffs reserved the 
right to call any of the defendants' experts (R. 827, f 3) and designated Dr. 
Nageotte as a trial witness (R. 1011,14). So there is no claim that Dr. Nageotte 
was not timely identified or that the Hospital would have been surprised by his 
testimony. 
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The Hospital moved before trial to preclude Dr. Nageotte from testifying 
that the Hospital breached the standard of care because Dr. Nageotte was not a 
nurse and because his testimony would be cumulative of that of the plaintiffs' 
nursing expert (Dr. Mahlmeister). (See R. 1338-39.) The trial court took the 
motion under advisement. (See R. 3019, at 811:17-822:11.) 
At the conclusion of the Hospital's case, the plaintiffs asked to read Dr. 
Nageotte's deposition to rebut the testimony of the Hospital's liability expert, Ms. 
Harvey, on the interpretation of fetal monitoring strips. (See R. 3023, at 2077:10-
13, 2084:14-20.) Ms. Harvey testified that the nurses did not need to call Dr. 
Richards at 5:50 a.m. (R. 3022, at 1748:21-25.) Dr. Nageotte would have testified 
that Dr. Richards should have been called at 5:50 a.m. because the fetal heart 
monitoring strip indicated a problem with the baby at that time, and, if Dr. 
Richards had been called then, he could have responded appropriately. (See R. 
3023, at 2086:15-19.) The trial court denied the motion, saying that the testimony 
was "cumulative" and was being offered for an improper purpose, namely, to 
rehabilitate the plaintiffs' own expert, Dr. John Elliott (See id. at 2085:25-2086:1, 
2093:9-13.) 
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Dr. Nageotte's testimony was proper rebuttal testimony because it tended 
to "refute, modify, explain, or otherwise minimize or nullify" Ms. Harvey's 
testimony that it was okay for the nurses not to have called Dr. Richards at 5:50 
a.m.34 The fact that the plaintiffs may have been able to present Dr. Nageotte's 
testimony as part of their case-in-chief does not mean that it was not proper 
rebuttal evidence.35 Similarly, just because Dr. Nageotte's testimony may have 
overlapped with testimony in the plaintiffs' case-in-chief or even contradicted 
that testimony was not a valid basis for excluding the evidence.36 
'"Fundamental fairness requires that a party be permitted to introduce 
evidence to rebut inferences the jury can draw from the opposing party's 
evidence.'"37 Here, the trial court excluded such evidence, thereby depriving the 
plaintiffs of a fair trial. The Court should therefore reverse the judgment. 
34
 See Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329,1338 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted). 
35
 Astill v. Clark 956 P.2d 1081,1086 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("evidence 
should not be excluded from rebuttal merely because it could have been made 
part of the case-in-chief") (citations omitted). 
36
 See Randle, 862 P.2d at 1338 ("As a general rule, testimony presented 
for the purpose of rebuttal should be admitted, even if the rebuttal is somewhat 
repetitive of testimony on issues addressed during the case-in-chief.") (citations 
omitted). 
37
 Astill 956 P.2d at 1087 (quoting Morrison v. Air Cal, 699 P.2d 600, 603 
(Nev. 1985)). 
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B. The Trial Court Erred When It Did Not Allow the Plaintiffs to Call Ms. 
Walker in Rebuttal. 
In her trial testimony, Ms. Harvey, the Hospital's nursing expert, testified 
at length about what she teaches nurses about reading fetal heart monitor strips. 
{See, e.g., R. 3022, at 1700:25-1702:1,1741:24-25,1785:7-23,1789:15-19,1790:21-23, 
1801:6-1808:21,1821:2-22,1826:20-1827:12.) The plaintiffs were prepared to call a 
witness, Judith Walker, a nurse from Colorado, who would have testified that 
what Ms. Harvey told the jury was different from what she taught nurses in her 
seminars and training programs. {See R. 3023, at 2077:20-14, 2081:14-2082:11.) 
This was classic rebuttal testimony.38 Ms. Walker's testimony was proper 
rebuttal testimony "because its purpose was to minimize the effect of [Ms. 
Harvey's] testimony and undermine the bases of [her] conclusions."39 Evidence 
that the defendant's expert teaches nurses differently from the way she was 
38
 See, e.g., Randle, 862 P.2d at 1338 ("Rebuttal evidence is evidence 
tending to refute, modify, explain, or otherwise minimize or nullify the effect of 
the opponent's evidence/') (citation omitted); Astill, 956 P.2d at 1086 (rebuttal 
evidence is "evidence required to counter new facts presented in the defendant's 
case-in-chief") (citation omitted); Roundy v. Staley, 1999 UT App 229, \ 12, 984 
P.2d 404 ("rebuttal evidence is that which a party may or may not use, depending 
on the testimony elicited at trial"), cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999). 
39
 See Randle, 862 P.2d at 1338. 
39 
expected to testify at trial was not properly part of the plaintiffs' case-in-chief but 
was pure rebuttal evidence.40 
The trial court excluded the testimony under Turner v. Nelson41 because, it 
concluded, the plaintiffs could have reasonably anticipated the need for the 
testimony before trial and did not disclose Ms. Walker as a potential rebuttal 
witness within the time required for disclosures. (See R. 3023, at 2083:22-2084:9.) 
This case is distinguishable from Turner. In Turner, the court ordered the 
parties to disclose all witnesses by a certain date, "without differentiating 
between case-in-chief and rebuttal witnesses,"42 and neither party distinguished 
between case-in-chief and rebuttal witnesses in their pretrial designations. Here, 
on the other hand, the parties' pretrial disclosures of witnesses were governed by 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(4). (See R. 104-06; see also R. 118-20; R. 145; R. 
255-56; R. 290-91; R. 821-25.) That rule requires parties to disclose the names of 
witnesses that they "may present at trial other than solely for impeachment."*3 Also, 
40
 Cf Astill, 956 P.2d at 1086 (a plaintiff "need not anticipate and then 
disprove defendant's potential theory of the case") (citations omitted). 
41
 872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1994). 
42
 See id. at 1024, n.2, & 1022. 
43
 UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(a)(4) (emphasis added). 
40 
the plaintiffs' trial witness list distinguished between witnesses they intended to 
call in their case-in-chief and rebuttal witnesses. (See R. 1010,f8.) 
Ms. Walker's testimony was solely to impeach Ms. Harvey's testimony and 
thus was not required to be disclosed sooner under rule 26(a)(4). Moreover, part 
of Ms. Walker's proposed testimony was based on a presentation that Ms. 
Harvey made to nurses just a few weeks before trial and that Ms. Walker just 
became aware of. (See R. 3022, at 1801:15-1802:5.) The plaintiffs could not have 
anticipated the need for this testimony when they served their trial witness list 
thirty days before trial. (See R. 3023, at 2084:20-24.) The trial court therefore 
erred when it refused to allow the plaintiffs to call Ms. Walker in rebuttal. 
C. The Trial Court Erred When It Did Not Allow the Plaintiffs to Call 
Nurse Anderson in Rebuttal. 
Before the Hospital retained Carol Harvey as an expert, it designated 
another expert on the standard of care applicable to nurses and hospitals—Laurie 
Anderson, a local nurse who was not affiliated with HCA. (See R. 247-49.)44 At 
her deposition, Ms. Anderson gave testimony favorable to the plaintiffs. She 
44
 According to her curriculum vita, Ms. Anderson worked for Utah 
Valley Pediatrics and Primary Children's Medical Center (R. 247), neither of 




testified that the presence of blood-tinged fluid when Mrs. Braithwaite's 
membranes were ruptured could be a sign of a partial placental abruption that 
should have put the nurses on a higher level of alert to monitor the patient, 
particularly, to watch the fetal heart monitor more intensely for decelerations. (R. 
2101, at 37:14-24, 38:9-17.) She testified that the nurses should have prepped Mrs. 
Braithwaite for a C-section after they had tried other means of bringing the 
baby's heart rate back after the deceleration at 5:48 a.m. (R. 2098, at 49:15-50:6.) 
She testified, contrary to Ms. Harvey, that it was a breach of the standard of care 
for Nurse Law to have tried scalp stimulation on Trevin during a deceleration. 
(Id. at 50:7-51:11. Cf. R. 3022, at 1741:24-1742:6 (while Ms. Harvey doesn't 
recommend or teach doing scalp stimulations during a deceleration, "[i]t seems 
to be very common around the country").) Ms. Anderson testified, contrary to 
Ms. Harvey, that Nurse Law probably did not have enough training to be in 
charge of Mrs. Braithwaite's monitoring without supervision. (R. 2097, at 56:8-25; 
R. 2096, at 57:1-4. Cf. R. 3022, at 1757:4-14 (according to Ms. Harvey, Ms. Law 
had adequate training and education in fetal monitoring).) Ms. Anderson 
testified, contrary to Ms. Harvey, that Dr. Richards should have been called a 
little sooner and that, if he had been and Mrs. Braithwaite had been prepped for 
surgery, there probably would not have been an injury to Trevin. (R. 2096, at 
42 
58:2-59:12. Cf. R. 3022, at 1727:20-23,1729:12-17 (according to Ms. Harvey, Dr. 
Richards did not need to be summoned back before 6:00 a.m.) Ms. Anderson also 
testified that the nurses should have communicated to the emergency room 
doctor, Dr. Roberts, that the baby might need to be delivered emergently, and if 
they had, the C-section could have been started at 6:03 a.m. (R. 2095, at 62:18-
64:13.) 
Well after the deadline for designating liability experts had passed, the 
Hospital designated Ms. Harvey as an expert. (R. 595-98.) The plaintiffs moved 
to strike the designation as untimely and cumulative. (R. 736-45.) After briefing 
on the motion was complete, the Hospital got a letter from Ms. Anderson saying 
that she did not wish to testify at trial and "will no longer be available as an 
expert witness/' (R. 801.) Based in large part on Ms. Anderson's unavailability, 
the trial court allowed the Hospital to call Ms. Harvey as an expert at trial, but 
indicated that the court's inclination was to let the plaintiffs use Ms. Anderson's 
deposition at trial. (See R. 3014, at 27:9-14, 28:1-12, 28:25-29:13.) 
The Hospital moved in limine to exclude Ms. Anderson's testimony. (R. 
1066-67.) The plaintiffs responded that they should be allowed to use Ms. 
Anderson's deposition during cross-examination of the Hospital's experts and in 
rebuttal. (R. 2114-23.) The trial court granted the Hospital's motion on the 
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grounds that Ms. Anderson was not qualified to testify as an expert and that her 
testimony would be cumulative of Dr. Mahlmeister's testimony. (R. 3019, at 
810:18-811:11.) 
There was sufficient evidence in the record to show that Ms. Anderson was 
"qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education/'45 
The Hospital thought she was qualified as an expert because it designated her as 
one. Ms. Anderson taught labor and delivery management up through 1995, 
four years before Trevin's birth. (See R. 2081-85; R. 2107, at 16:4-11.) Although 
she had not practiced labor and delivery management since 1985, she stayed 
current in the field by reading journals and doing continuing education classes. 
(R. 2106, at 17:7-19.) She taught fetal heart monitoring at Weber State University. 
(Id. at 20:10-19.) Ms. Anderson considered herself an expert in fetal heart 
monitoring as of 1995 and thought the standards had not changed since then. (R. 
2105, at 22:3-24.) 
The fact that some of Ms. Anderson's opinions were also held by Dr. 
Mahlmeister was not grounds for excluding her as a rebuttal witness.46 The fact 
45
 UTAH R.EVID. 702(a). 
46
 See, e.g., Randle, 862 P.2d at 1338 ("As a general rule, testimony 
presented for the purpose of rebuttal should be admitted, even if the rebuttal is 
44 
that Ms. Anderson was retained as an expert for the Hospital gave her testimony 
weight that the other experts' testimony did not have. 
In Board of Education of South Sanpete School District v. Barton,47 the court 
held that it was error not to let the defendant call an expert who had prepared an 
appraisal at the request of the plaintiff without allowing the defendant to elicit 
the fact that the witness had been employed by the plaintiff. The witness's 
testimony was "directly probative of the central issue in the case."48 Moreover, 
[t]hat testimony, with the likelihood of greater objectivity, would have 
served to rebut the... testimony of plaintiffs expert witnesses. To deny 
the defendant that right is to deny him a fair trial. The jury was entitled 
to know the essential background facts of the witness so as to be able 
to give proper weight to his testimony. 
The defendant had a right to bring to the jury's attention the 
fact that a witness had been initially enlisted by plaintiff and 
pursuant to that employment had acquired his knowledge and 
formed his opinion The circumstances by which [the witness] 
became aware of the facts needed to form his opinion provided the 
necessary foundation for the jury to weigh the . . . testimony. More 
importantly, his employment bore directly on the all-important issue of his 
objectivity or bias. This information was essential, especially in light of the 
somewhat repetitive of testimony on issues addressed during the case-in-chief.") 
(citations omitted); Astill, 956 P.2d at 1086 ("evidence should not be excluded 
from rebuttal merely because it could have been made part of the case-in-chief") 
(citations omitted). 
47
 617 P.2d 347 (Utah 1980). 
48
 Id. at 350. 
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highly disparate view of the same facts that may be arrived at by different 
experts}9 
Here, on the same facts, Dr. Mahlmeister and Ms. Harvey testified, 
respectively, that the Hospital did and did not breach the standard of care. The 
Hospital had previously put forth an expert who conceded that the Hospital had 
breached the standard of care in some respects. After new counsel took over the 
case for the Hospital and the plaintiffs moved to strike its belated designation of 
Ms. Harvey as another expert, Ms. Anderson suddenly became unavailable to 
testify. The plaintiffs were "clearly . . . entitled'' to the testimony of Ms. 
Anderson "simply because it may well have been less likely to be biased than 
[that of] any of the other experts called by the parties/'50 Ms. Anderson's 
opinions were arrived at "under the direction of the party adverse to the party 
who sought to adduce [her] testimony and thus carried a mark of objectivity that 
may not have been commanded by the other experts."51 "It is axiomatic that an 
attack on the credibility of a party's witnesses may be conducted by the other 
49
 Id. (emphasis added). 
50
 See id. See also UTAH R. Civ. P. 32(a) (any deposition may be used for 
the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of a deponent as a 
witness or for any other purpose permitted by the Utah Rules of Evidence). 
51
 Barton, 617 P.2d at 350. 
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party either by his own cross-examination of the witnesses or by calling other 
witnesses to accomplish that purpose/'52 
The trial court abused its discretion by not allowing the plaintiffs to attack 
Ms. Harvey's credibility by calling Ms. Anderson in rebuttal. 
III. 
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE TRIAL COURTS ERRORS 
DEPRIVED THE PLAINTIFFS OF A FAIR TRIAL. 
Under the cumulative error doctrine, an appellate court will reverse if the 
cumulative effect of the trial court's errors undermines its confidence that a fair 
trial was had.53 Although a trial court has some discretion in the admission of 
evidence, the trial court here abused its discretion. Even if no single error alone 
would justify reversal, the cumulative effect of the trial court's decisions 
deprived the plaintiffs of a fair trial, thereby affecting their substantial rights and 
requiring a new trial.54 
52
 Id. (citation omitted). 
53
 Radman v. Flanders Corp., 2007 UT App 351, % 20,172 P.3d 668 
(citations omitted), cert denied, 186 P.3d 957 (Utah 2008). 
54
 See UTAH R. EVID. 103(a); 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. 
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 5035, at 616 ("a series of 
evidentiary errors, none of which could qualify as 'reversible error' but which 
47 
The trial court's decision to preclude any mention of HCA affected every 
aspect of the trial, from voir dire through closing arguments. It prevented the 
plaintiffs from exploring the critical area of bias not only with the jury venire but 
also with the key fact witnesses and the Hospital's only liability expert. It also 
allowed the Hospital to appeal to the jurors' sympathies by leaving the jury with 
the misleading impression that any verdict against the Hospital would be against 
their own "community hospital." 
The trial court's decisions with respect to Dr. Nageotte, Ms. Walker, and 
Ms. Anderson deprived the plaintiffs of any witness to rebut the testimony of Ms. 
Harvey, the key witness in the case. 
The plaintiffs had the burden of proof. They established a prima facie case 
of negligence against the Hospital through the testimony of their nursing expert, 
Dr. Mahlmeister. But that prima facie case only stands until its weight is met by 
evidence to the contrary. If all the plaintiffs had was their prima facie case, the 
Hospital "need not overcome it by a preponderance of evidence" but could 
collectively suffice to justify a reversal" is cumulative error) (footnote omitted), & 
5035.2, at 631 ("A single error in admitting or excluding evidence may appear 
trivial but when the error is repeated over and over or is combined with other 
different errors, courts may find the sum of the 'harmless' errors to be 
reversible.") (footnote omitted) (2nd ed. 2005). 
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prevail if it only "equalize[d]" or "just counterbalance[d]" the plaintiffs' case. 
Ms. Harvey contradicted Dr. Mahlmeister's testimony. It was therefore critical 
that the plaintiffs have an opportunity to fully attack Ms. Harvey's credibility 
and rebut her testimony. 
The trial court's rulings improperly restricted the plaintiffs from cross-
examining Ms. Harvey to show her motive to favor HCA, the Hospital's parent 
company, and they deprived the plaintiffs of any rebuttal witness. The trial 
court's rulings therefore had the effect of immunizing the Hospital's key liability 
witness from attack. Yet the Hospital was given full rein to attack the plaintiffs' 
experts for bias arising out of their associations. The effect of the trial court's 
rulings was to make Ms. Harvey bulletproof. In effect, Trevin Braithwaite was 
forced to enter the ring with one hand tied behind his back. The jury apparently 
accepted Ms. Harvey's testimony at face value, because it accepted her judgment 
that the Hospital did not breach any standard of care and never reached the 
questions of causation and damages. By unfairly restricting the plaintiffs' ability 
to challenge Ms. Harvey's credibility and refute her testimony, the trial court's 
55
 Topinka v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 248 N.W. 660, 662 (Minn. 
1933). 
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rulings affected the plaintiffs7 substantial rights and deprived them of a fair trial, 
requiring reversal.56 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's rulings forbidding any mention of HCA, the Hospital's 
parent company, and denying the plaintiffs any opportunity to present rebuttal 
testimony deprived the plaintiffs of a fair trial. The Court should therefore 
reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case to the district court 
for a new trial. 
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26. General provisions governing discovery. 
(a)(4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to other parties the 
following information regarding the evidence that it may present at trial other 
than solely for impeachment: 
(a)(4)(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and 
telephone number of each witness, separately identifying witnesses the party 
expects to present and witnesses the party may call if the need arises; 
(a)(4)(B) the designation of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be 
presented by means of a deposition and, if not taken stenographically, a 
transcript of the pertinent portions of the deposition testimony; and 
(a)(4)(C) an appropriate identification of each document or other exhibit, 
including summaries of other evidence, separately identifying those which the 
party expects to offer and those which the party may offer if the need arises. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the 
disclosures required by subdivision (a)(4) shall be made at least 30 days before 
trial. Within 14 days thereafter, unless a different time is specified by the court, a 
party may serve and file a list disclosing (i) any objections to the use under Rule 
32(a) of a deposition designated by another party under subparagraph (B) and 
(ii) any objection, together with the grounds therefor, that may be made to the 
admissibility of materials identified under subparagraph (C). Objections not so 
disclosed, other than objections under Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, shall be deemed waived unless excused by the court for good cause 
shown. 
53 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 32. Use of depositions in court proceedings, 
(a) Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an 
interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible 
under the rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and 
testifying, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the 
taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof, in accordance with 
any of the following provisions: 
(a)(1) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of 
contradicting or impeaching the testimony of a deponent as a witness or for any 
other purpose permitted by the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(a)(2) The deposition of a party or of anyone who at the time of taking the 
deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent, or a person designated 
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a public or private corporation, 
partnership or association or governmental agency which is a party may be used 
by an adverse party for any purpose. 
(a)(3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by 
any party for any purpose if the court finds: 
(a)(3)(A) that the witness is dead; or 
(a)(3)(B) that the witness is at a greater distance than 100 miles from the 
place of trial or hearing, or is out of the United States, unless it appears that the 
absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition; or 
(a)(3)(C) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, 
illness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or 
(a)(3)(D) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure 
the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or 
(a)(3)(E) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances 
exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the 
54 
importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to 
allow the deposition to be used. 
(a)(4) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, an 
adverse party may require him to introduce any other part which ought in 
fairness to be considered with the part introduced, and any party may introduce 
any other parts. 
Substitution of parties pursuant to Rule 25 does not affect the right to use 
depositions previously taken; and when an action has been brought in any court 
of the United States or of any state and another action involving the same subject 
matter is afterward brought between the same parties or their representatives or 
successors in interest, all depositions lawfully taken and duly filed in the former 
action may be used in the latter as if originally taken therefor. A deposition 
previously taken may also be used as permitted by the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
55 
Utah Rule of Evidence 702. Testimony by experts, 
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise. 
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the 
basis for expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles or 
methods underlying the testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i) are 
reliable, (ii) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have been reliably 
applied to the facts of the case. 
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